A clipboard paste on Microsoft’s own device-login page was enough. Operators running phishing-as-a-service kits under panel names BlackApex, DarkApex, SPY, and XXX101 lured workforce users with SharePoint, Zoom, OneDrive, and similar themes, had them paste a Microsoft device code, and let them finish sign-in on the genuine Microsoft page, MFA included. Attacker backends then redeemed that code for Microsoft 365 access and refresh tokens, and could capture a Primary Refresh Token used against mailboxes. According to LevelBlue SpiderLabs on 30 October 2026, researchers observed more than 70 kit instances sharing the same backend and admin panel infrastructure. LevelBlue did not name victim organizations or publish a victim count.
How SharePoint and Zoom themes fed a real device code
Delivery started upstream of the Microsoft page. Spearphishing rode trusted services, including Google share links and PDFs that pointed people at Microsoft Forms, before the device-code lure appeared. Kit front ends themed as SharePoint, Zoom, OneDrive, Adobe Acrobat Sign, and Excel copied a Microsoft device code to the clipboard and opened microsoft.com/devicelogin, or ended at login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/deviceauth.
The user pasted the code into Microsoft’s real device-login flow. Sign-in UI could show approval for “Microsoft Authentication Broker” on another device. Authentication, including whatever MFA the tenant required on that genuine page, completed under the victim’s hands. According to LevelBlue SpiderLabs, “By then the attacker’s server has redeemed the code and holds a live access token and refresh token for the victim’s Microsoft 365 account.”
That sequence matters because the login ceremony looked legitimate. There was no need for a reverse-proxy clone of the password form. The kit already held the device code the user was coached to submit. The backend only had to poll and redeem what Microsoft issued after a successful sign-in.
Through 2026, device-code phishing via ready-made PhaaS was already an accessible technique. Public reporting also covered adjacent kits such as EvilTokens, Kali365, and Tycoon2FA that weaponized the same Microsoft device-code pattern. LevelBlue states the BlackApex/SPY family does not match those publicly documented kits, even though the underlying device-code abuse class is the same industrial idea: get a human to finish a real brokered login the operator can cash in.
Why MFA on the genuine Microsoft page still lost
MFA ran. It ran for the wrong party’s benefit. LevelBlue SpiderLabs put the failure in plain language: “The victim completed MFA themselves, so the control meant to stop the attacker was satisfied by the wrong person.” The second factor never had to be typed into a spoofed page or relayed through a proxy. It only had to succeed on microsoft.com after the kit-controlled device code was accepted.
| Control in play | What happened in this kit flow | Why it failed the enterprise |
|---|---|---|
| Password on real Microsoft page | Victim signed in on genuine device-login | Operator never needed a fake password form |
| MFA on genuine device-login | Victim approved or entered MFA | MFA proved the victim, not the operator’s intent |
| Device code redemption | Backend polled and exchanged the code | Tokens issued to the party that held the code |
| Password reset later | PRT-backed access could continue | Refresh material outlived the password |
Once redemption succeeded, mail and related workloads followed the token, not a fresh human login at every boundary.
No public attribution tied these panels to a single named threat actor. The disclosure is infrastructure and kit telemetry, not a one-company incident write-up. That still leaves defenders with a concrete workforce identity problem: any tenant that still allows users to complete device-code style brokered logins after a coached paste is volunteering a redeemable token path.
What Primary Refresh Tokens bought after redemption
Access and refresh tokens were the first prize. According to LevelBlue SpiderLabs, the kits also captured a Primary Refresh Token (PRT), displayed it in the administrative panel, and used it to reach the victim’s mailbox. PRT-backed access extended SSO-style persistence beyond a single interactive session. Intake notes on this family also state that material remained usable after a password reset, which is the opposite of what helpdesks assume when they treat “reset the password” as full containment.
Mailbox API reach followed the redeemed OAuth and PRT material. Operators did not need a second phishable login to read mail once those tokens were live. Session lifetime configuration only forces the attacker to re-use or re-steal sooner. It does not undo a redemption that already succeeded, and it does nothing useful if long-lived refresh or PRT-class material still authorizes the client the kit controls.
Files or messages taken after a live cloud session exists are not rolled back by stronger login theater on the next attempt. Effective prevention keeps the coached device-code ceremony from ever yielding an attacker-redeemable token. Residual theft from malware on a machine that already holds a legitimate session is a different, harder problem. This disclosure is about the cheap remote path, the PhaaS panel, and the genuine Microsoft page doing exactly what it was designed to do for whoever presents a valid completed device code.
Defenders who only hunt fake login domains will miss kits that open the real device-login URL and wait. Defenders who only count MFA prompts will see successful MFA and still lose the mailbox. The useful questions are narrower: Is device-code completion still offered to standard workforce accounts? Do admin panels elsewhere light up when a PRT appears after a themed lure? Can password reset actually invalidate the refresh classes your IdP handed out?
Adjacent PhaaS activity through 2026 showed the technique was productized well before this panel cluster was written up. BlackApex, DarkApex, SPY, and XXX101 simply make the operator experience obvious: shared backends, shared admin chrome, token fields in the clear, mailbox follow-on as a feature.
The defensive side of this case is covered in the related article on mfa2point0.com: how to prevent Microsoft device-code phishing and PRT theft.
FAQ
How did BlackApex and SPY kits get Microsoft 365 access without a fake login page?
BlackApex and SPY-family kits got Microsoft 365 access by coaching workforce users to paste a Microsoft device code and finish sign-in on the genuine Microsoft device-login page. According to LevelBlue SpiderLabs, the attacker backend then redeemed the completed code for live access and refresh tokens. MFA on that real page was completed by the victim, so it did not block redemption.
Did MFA fail in the BlackApex device-code phishing flow?
MFA did not “fail open” as a missing checkbox. In the BlackApex/SPY device-code flow, MFA succeeded for the victim on Microsoft’s real page while the kit held the device code being redeemed. LevelBlue SpiderLabs reported that the victim completed MFA themselves, which satisfied the control without stopping the operator who cashed in the tokens.
What is a Primary Refresh Token in the BlackApex kit reporting?
In the BlackApex/SPY kit reporting, a Primary Refresh Token is cloud session material the panel displayed and used to reach the victim’s Microsoft 365 mailbox. According to LevelBlue SpiderLabs, PRT capture supported continued access with SSO-style persistence beyond a single session, and related notes describe usability even after a password reset.
Were specific companies named as BlackApex victims?
LevelBlue’s BlackApex/SPY disclosure did not name victim organizations and did not publish victim or record counts. The public story is a PhaaS infrastructure and kit family write-up, with more than 70 observed instances sharing backend and admin panel design, not a single-company breach filing.
Is BlackApex the same kit as EvilTokens, Kali365, or Tycoon2FA?
LevelBlue states the BlackApex/SPY family does not match the publicly documented EvilTokens, Kali365, or Tycoon2FA kits. Those other PhaaS offerings also abused Microsoft device-code sign-in through 2026, so the technique class overlaps even when the panel families are treated as distinct.