A live Microsoft Graph bearer token left a managed law-firm laptop during a spoofed IT video call, already valid after a normal compliant-device sign-in. According to ReliaQuest Threat Research, Luna Moth (also tracked as Silent Ransom Group) operators replayed that token from their own infrastructure within about a minute and bulk-downloaded thousands of files through the Graph API in roughly an hour. No attacker sign-in events and no endpoint malware showed up in the observed activity. MFA and Conditional Access had already done their job at issuance. The call simply talked the employee into copying the token out of browser DevTools and pasting it to an attacker-controlled paste site.

How the spoofed IT call harvested a live Graph token

Luna Moth re-targeted law firms it had already pressured in earlier extortion rounds. The fresh lure was a blank-subject message from a free mailbox carrying a deliberately broken PDF, then a spoofed IT-support call, often to a personal number, offering to “fix” the bad attachment. On a video call with screen share, the caller walked the employee through opening Microsoft 365 Copilot in the browser on the managed device, opening developer tools, finding the Microsoft Graph bearer access token on the Copilot-to-Graph request, and pasting that string into a public text-sharing site the attackers controlled.

The token was not guessed, cracked, or pulled by malware. The employee completed a legitimate Microsoft session on a real compliant device, then handed the already-issued bearer credential to someone who never needed to authenticate as that user. ReliaQuest notes the technique shares a core idea with device-code phishing: the victim takes part in a legitimate Microsoft process that produces a valid token instead of typing a password for the attacker. Here the token is issued to the victim’s device first, then walked out of band.

Earlier Luna Moth work against law firms, documented by the same ReliaQuest spotlight since at least mid-2023, leaned on IT-support vishing plus remote-management tools and manual downloads to personal cloud storage, still without encryption. By late August the group had already been pairing video calls with built-in Windows remote assistance. The October through early November 2026 wave kept the social script and swapped the exfil path for a Graph bearer handoff that never required the attacker on the endpoint.

Public reporting has not named the law firms in this round, has not published victim counts or total records, and has not named the video-call platform beyond noting it is typically permitted software.

Why MFA and Conditional Access already looked green

The Microsoft Graph access token was issued after the employee completed sign-in on a managed compliant device. MFA and Conditional Access were satisfied at that moment. ReliaQuest states the stolen token passes Conditional Access because the device check runs at sign-in, not when the token is later used. Once issued, that bearer string is a portable proof of access until it expires or is cut off by another control.

Default Microsoft access-token lifetime sits around 60 to 90 minutes. Continuous Access Evaluation can stretch supported tokens much longer or revoke them early when conditions change, such as location or account disablement. Without CAE and strict location enforcement, a token stolen on a trusted laptop keeps working from attacker infrastructure until the clock runs out. Conditional Access does not re-evaluate every Graph call the way a fresh interactive login would.

Control What the call faced What still worked for attackers
Compliant-device MFA Already passed at sign-in Token already issued
Conditional Access Device check at login only No re-check on token use
Endpoint malware defenses Nothing to detect on disk Pure bearer replay off-box
Sign-in logs No attacker login event Graph API calls with stolen token

What is clear is the failure mode: authentication had finished. The social engineering target was the live session material sitting in the browser, not a password field or a push prompt.

Paste site to thousands of files in about an hour

Attackers took the pasted bearer token to their own servers and started calling Microsoft Graph. ReliaQuest reports replay within about a minute and bulk download of thousands of files in roughly an hour. The blast went straight at cloud content the Graph API can reach for that identity, which for a law firm means client files, mail-adjacent data, and anything else the account’s permissions already allowed. No ransomware encryptor. No remote-management agent left behind in the observed cases. The pressure model stays pure data extortion, including second-round theft from firms that earlier appeared on the group’s leak site after prior campaigns.

Session and API bearer tokens are skeleton keys for whatever scopes they carry. Shortening lifetime only shrinks the window. It does not stop a one-minute handoff followed by an hour of Graph pulls. If the attackers also register lasting access during a window, lifetime math stops mattering for later revisits. Defenders who only hunt for failed logins or unknown devices will miss a path that never creates either signal.

Client confidentiality, breach-notification duty, and reputation risk sit on top of the technical loss. Law firms hold privileged material by design. A quiet Graph bulk pull from attacker infrastructure is a different operational nightmare than an encryptor that trips every alarm on the floor.

Stopping this class of loss is not the same problem as stopping a fake login page. The token already existed after a good sign-in. Containment needs fast revoke, Continuous Access Evaluation with hard location rules, tight Graph and session visibility, and training that treats “open DevTools and paste this string” as an immediate incident, not an IT chore. Architectural work that reduces long-lived bearer replay and forces stronger binding on every access decision belongs in the prevention conversation, not as a claim that a different login ceremony would have erased a token the user was coached to export after MFA had already succeeded.

why MFA and Conditional Access did not stop Graph bearer replay.

FAQ

How did Luna Moth steal Microsoft 365 data from law firms without malware?

Luna Moth stole Microsoft 365 data from law firms by coaching employees on spoofed IT video calls to copy a live Microsoft Graph bearer access token from Microsoft 365 Copilot browser DevTools and paste it to an attacker-controlled paste site. According to ReliaQuest Threat Research, operators replayed that token from their own servers within about a minute and bulk-downloaded thousands of files via the Graph API in roughly an hour, with no endpoint malware and no attacker sign-in events observed.

Did MFA fail during the Luna Moth Graph token campaign?

MFA did not fail at login in the Luna Moth Graph token campaign described by ReliaQuest. The Graph access token was issued after the employee completed sign-in on a managed compliant device. MFA and Conditional Access were already satisfied at issuance. The attackers never needed a second sign-in. They used the already-issued bearer token the employee was talked into exporting.

Why did Conditional Access allow Luna Moth’s Graph downloads?

Conditional Access allowed Luna Moth’s Graph downloads because, as ReliaQuest states, the device check runs at sign-in and does not re-check the token every time it is used. A bearer token stolen after a compliant login remains valid from other locations until expiry unless Continuous Access Evaluation and strict location enforcement cut it off.

How is this Luna Moth method different from the group’s earlier law-firm attacks?

This Luna Moth method still starts with IT-support vishing against law firms, but exfiltration moved from remote-management tools and manual downloads to a live Microsoft Graph bearer token handed over from Copilot DevTools. ReliaQuest ties the October through early November 2026 activity to re-targeting of firms previously pressured in earlier rounds, including firms that later appeared on the group’s data-leak site.

What should law-firm IT watch for after a blank email and a sudden IT callback?

Law-firm IT should treat a blank-subject free-mailbox email with a broken PDF plus an unexpected IT callback, especially to a personal number, as a live social-engineering incident. Opening DevTools to copy tokens and pasting session material into external paste sites is the handoff path described in the reporting; staff should hang up and call IT on a known internal number instead. Security teams should hunt for anomalous Graph API bulk download patterns and be ready to revoke sessions fast even when no new sign-in appears.