One accepted MFA push on a Google Workspace Super Admin account handed a Russia-linked crew the keys to domain-wide export tools. According to Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant, COLD RELIC signed in with stolen Super Admin credentials, hammered push notifications until one was approved, then used that seat for Customer Takeout, mass Drive sharing, roster export, and Alert Center cleanup. Months later the same operators impersonated an employee from that first US organization over encrypted messaging and phished a second US organization’s Microsoft Entra ID credentials and authentication tokens used for federated SSO into Google Workspace. Public reporting does not name the victim organizations or quantify how many files left the tenants.
How Super Admin push fatigue opened the door
COLD RELIC authenticated with stolen Super Admin credentials and a multi-factor authentication push notification fatigue attack. GTIG and Mandiant state that plainly in the case study. The password was already in attacker hands. The second factor was a spam-approvable push on a privileged account, not a hardware-bound proof that only the enrolled device can complete.
Actors routed the login through a US residential proxy geolocated near the victim. That proximity detail reduces the chance a location anomaly alone stops a Super Admin sign-in. Once the push was accepted, the session was a normal Super Admin session. Nothing about the approval ceremony required the operator to prove possession of a device-bound private key that never leaves hardware.
Push fatigue works because the factor is transferable attention. Anyone who can trigger prompts can wait for a tired or hurried admin to tap Allow. Super Admin rights then turn a single yes into tenant-wide power. The first intrusion, dated by GTIG and Mandiant to late 2025, is the foundation for everything that followed in this campaign.
Google’s disclosure also ties COLD RELIC to the wider COLDRIVER / UNC4057 / Star Blizzard / Callisto / Gossamer Bear cluster and notes the US Department of Justice assessment that the group operates within Russia’s FSB. Attribution is secondary to the login failure. A privileged cloud identity with a phishable second factor is the product defect attackers keep buying.
Rogue passkeys, OAuth sync, and domain-wide takeout
After the Super Admin login, COLD RELIC registered a previously unseen device model along with passkeys, MFA backup codes, and rogue MFA devices. According to GTIG and Mandiant, attacker-enrolled passkeys later supported reauthentication across password and session resets and bypassed device registration controls. Password change alone did not evict operators who had already planted their own factors.
Persistence also included OAuth inbox sync to external email clients. That keeps mail flowing outside the corporate UI while admins chase password tickets. Actors queried admin security investigation and email audit logs, viewed and modified Alert Center notifications, and deleted alerts that might have surfaced the intrusion. Antiforensics sat next to exfiltration, not after it.
With Super Admin rights they ran domain-wide Google Workspace Customer Takeout export, mass Drive sharing and downloads, and employee roster export. Those rosters and stolen identities became fuel for the next target. No ransom figure appears in the public case study. The business damage is quieter: directory data, mail context, and cloud files leaving under legitimate admin APIs.
| Control surface | What COLD RELIC did | Why it failed |
|---|---|---|
| Super Admin MFA push | Spam prompts until approval | Factor is a transferable tap |
| Post-login enrollment | Rogue passkeys, codes, devices | Enrollment trusted the stolen session |
| Password / session reset | Reauth with attacker passkeys | Planted factors outlived the reset |
| Alert Center | View, modify, delete notices | Super Admin can silence telemetry |
Enrollment after a compromised privileged session is the same social-engineering class as coaching someone through a fake login. The transferable secret is whatever IT or the console will accept to add a new factor. When that secret is a push, a backup code, or an unbound passkey ceremony reachable from a hijacked Super Admin seat, the attacker becomes a “legitimate” authenticator owner.
Entra ID phishing for federated Google Workspace SSO
Several months after the first intrusion, COLD RELIC moved on a second US organization that used Microsoft Entra ID as the federated SSO identity provider for Google Workspace. Actors impersonated an employee of the first victim over encrypted messaging. Trust came from a real coworker name and conversation context stolen earlier, not from a cold email.
According to GTIG and Mandiant, phishing links were designed to steal credentials and authentication tokens for Entra ID, then redirected victims to document lures relevant to the ongoing chat so the request felt in-thread. After a successful capture, operators registered a new MFA device in the SSO solution and bulk-downloaded cloud Drive files from the second tenant.
Federation amplified the blast radius. One Entra ID proof unlocked Google Workspace without a separate Google-native login ceremony. Stolen authentication tokens and unrevoked attacker sessions kept access alive where password resets did not fully kill existing sessions and attacker-enrolled factors. The public case study stresses that password changes alone are insufficient: revoke sessions, refresh tokens, and OAuth grants, and remove unauthorized passkeys, backup codes, and MFA devices.
In June 2026 a COLD RELIC redirector URL carrying a query parameter referencing the first victim was submitted to VirusTotal. GTIG and Mandiant published the linked intrusions on 17 November 2026 and reported new COLD RELIC phishing activity as recently as November 2026. The playbook was still live when the write-up shipped.
The second victim’s Entra ID layer was the front door to Google Workspace data, and the pretext was identity and conversation context lifted from the first Super Admin breach.
Push-approvable MFA and phishable IdP logins are the shared weakness across both stages. A fix that removes spam-approvable pushes and live-stealable login factors exists; it is not another prompt on the same Super Admin path. How to prevent this attack is covered in the related article on preventing COLD RELIC-style push fatigue and Entra token phishing.
FAQ
How did COLD RELIC get into the first Google Workspace tenant?
COLD RELIC got into the first tenant by signing into a Google Workspace Super Admin account with stolen credentials and repeating MFA push notifications until one was accepted. According to Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant, the operators also used a US residential proxy near the victim so the login looked geographically plausible.
Why did password resets fail to kick COLD RELIC out?
Password resets failed to fully remove COLD RELIC because the actors had already enrolled passkeys, rogue MFA devices, and backup codes, and in places left sessions and factors unrevoked. GTIG and Mandiant describe attacker-enrolled passkeys that persisted across password and session resets and bypassed device registration controls, plus OAuth inbox sync to external clients.
How was the second organization compromised in the COLD RELIC case?
The second organization was compromised when COLD RELIC impersonated an employee of the first victim over encrypted messaging and phished Microsoft Entra ID credentials and authentication tokens used for federated SSO to Google Workspace. After that capture, the actors registered a new MFA device in the SSO stack and bulk-downloaded cloud Drive files.
Did COLD RELIC use ransomware or publish victim names?
Public GTIG and Mandiant reporting on COLD RELIC does not describe ransom demands, name the victim organizations, or publish quantified exfiltration volumes. Documented impact centers on Customer Takeout, mass Drive access, roster export, Alert Center tampering, and follow-on spear-phishing with stolen identities.
What should IT managers take from the Super Admin push-fatigue step?
IT managers should treat Super Admin push MFA as a high-value fatigue target: stolen passwords plus repeated prompts can yield a full admin session without malware on the endpoint. The COLD RELIC case shows that once that session exists, attackers plant their own factors and turn directory exports into impersonation fuel for the next federated tenant.