A captcha, a polished brand logo, and a familiar Google work sign-in were enough to put an operator one typed code away from a live session. According to Push Security on 20 November 2026, the GoodGuys AiTM phishing campaign has been live since at least mid-October 2026, using paid expert-interview and webinar invitations that impersonate brands including Accenture, Nvidia, SpaceX, and Google Cloud. Victims land on fake Google or Okta sign-in pages, type or approve passwords and MFA values, and an operator relays those values to the real service in real time so a usable work session is issued to the attackers.

Named victim companies and account totals are not in the public teardown. What is documented is the kit, the lures, and the login path that still treats SMS codes, authenticator codes, and push approvals as something a stranger can read and replay.

How interview lures reached fake Google and Okta pages

Operators started with credibility theater. Paid interview portals and webinar framing borrowed real employer and product names so the click felt like career or partner work, not a random credential trap. Push Security’s first captures on 13 October 2026 hit paid-interview-portal[.]com under Accenture and Spotify branding tied to a WPP Media title, with backend traffic already pointing at importantfuture[.]com. Okta screens showed up in builds by 15 October. Spotify and Culver’s skins followed mid-month. American Express appeared around 5 November. Coca-Cola skins arrived by 12 November. Nvidia and Google Cloud builds later shifted backend traffic to hypernovaguys[.]com, with a SpaceX skin on 17 November and a Google Cloud skin on 18 November. Landing hosts moved from AWS EC2 to Vultr around 13 November.

After the captcha, the path looked like ordinary workforce sign-in. Fake Google pages accepted only work accounts and rejected Gmail, Yahoo, and Outlook addresses. That filter alone marks the campaign as enterprise identity theft, not a consumer mailbox sweep. Okta username and password screens, Okta push prompts, and Okta Verify, authenticator, or SMS code steps sat in the same kit family. Luke Jennings at Push Security named the operation after a hidden label in every build: “GoodGuys sign-in simulation.”

Adjacent lure copy matters for defenders watching the same mail queues. Push had already analyzed a Starship Product Briefing fake-event campaign on 5 November 2026. The GoodGuys SpaceX skin reuses that lure language even though kits and hosting differ, so the same inbox themes can feed more than one build. Separate Coca-Cola phishing traffic in the same reporting window used a modified Evilginx reverse proxy. GoodGuys itself is a different machine.

How the operator relay completed real Google and Okta logins

GoodGuys does not sit as a transparent reverse proxy between the victim and the identity provider. The fake page collects email, password, and each later factor, then posts them as JSON (session_id, type, value, extra) to a backend submit.php. Socket.io commands drive the UI the way a person at a control panel would. Push’s assessment is direct: the commands look built for a human operator who replays each value against the real Google or Okta sign-in.

To the victim, the steps look the same as a normal Google sign-in. SMS codes, Google Authenticator codes, Google tap_code prompts, Okta push, and Okta Verify or SMS codes all still move. Each of those factors is transferable. Whoever holds the code or the approval can finish the ceremony on the real origin. The operator does exactly that. The session that results is not a mystery cookie stolen from memory after a clean login. It is a session the identity provider issued because the phishable login completed with live, relayed proof.

Control in play What GoodGuys did Why it failed
Password on fake page Victim typed it into attacker UI Operator replayed it on real IdP
SMS or authenticator code Kit prompted, victim entered Code is transferable, relayed live
Okta or Google push / tap Victim approved familiar prompt Approval is not origin-bound to real page
Work-account filter Rejected consumer mail domains Still harvested enterprise identities

Classic reverse-proxy kits such as Evilginx steal the session by sitting in the middle of the real protocol. GoodGuys steals the inputs and has a person finish the real protocol. Defenders who only hunt reverse-proxy fingerprints can miss a human-driven relay that still ends in the same place: attacker-held Google or Okta access after MFA that was designed to be typed, read aloud, or tapped on a phone.

Push’s public write-up does not name compromised organizations, does not publish affected account counts, and does not attribute a formal threat group beyond the GoodGuys moniker. Ransom notes and broader monetization paths beyond session theft are also outside what the teardown documents. The technical story is still enough. A workforce login that accepts a relayable second factor will hand a session to whoever can coach or capture that factor in time.

What the stolen sessions mean for workforce Google and Okta

Once the real IdP accepts the relayed password and MFA value, the attacker holds a normal authenticated session for that work account. Mail, drive content, SaaS apps behind Google or Okta, and whatever else that identity can reach become fair game for the dwell window of that token. Shortening session lifetime only forces the operator to re-run the lure sooner. It does not stop the first successful relay. Detection after the fact is cleanup. The failure happened when a transferable factor left the victim’s hands and arrived at an attacker keyboard.

Security teams watching brand-impersonating interview spam should treat Google work login and Okta login as the same class of problem here. The skins change. The backend hostnames rotate. The socket-driven UI stays aimed at live human replay. Push Security’s timeline from mid-October through the 20 November disclosure shows continuous skinning, not a one-day blast. That pattern favors quiet harvesting over noisy malware drops on day one.

A fix for this class of login exists when nothing transferable is left to type, approve, or read to a stranger. How to prevent this attack is covered in the related article on mfa2point0.com: how device-bound phishing-proof MFA stops operator-relayed AiTM on work logins.

FAQ

How did the GoodGuys AiTM phishing campaign actually steal Google and Okta access?

The GoodGuys AiTM phishing campaign stole Google and Okta access by showing fake work sign-in pages after paid interview and webinar lures, then having an operator relay each password and MFA value to the real Google or Okta service in real time. According to Push Security, the kit is not a reverse proxy. Victim inputs post to an attacker backend while socket.io commands drive the fake UI, and the real IdP issues a session because the relayed factors still count as valid login proof.

Did GoodGuys use Evilginx or another reverse-proxy AiTM kit?

GoodGuys did not use a reverse-proxy design for its core kit. Push Security states that GoodGuys does not use a reverse proxy and that operators replay collected values against real Google or Okta sign-in. Related Coca-Cola phishing lures in the same reporting window used a modified Evilginx proxy, which is a different technique from the GoodGuys control-panel relay.

Which MFA methods still failed against the GoodGuys fake sign-in pages?

SMS codes, Google Authenticator codes, Google tap_code prompts, Okta push, and Okta Verify, authenticator, or SMS codes all still failed against GoodGuys because each value or approval can be captured on the fake page and finished on the real service. The victim experience matched a normal Google or Okta flow, so the transferable factor did its job for the wrong party.

Were specific companies confirmed as GoodGuys victims?

No specific companies were confirmed as GoodGuys victims in the public Push Security teardown. The disclosure documents lures impersonating brands such as Accenture, Nvidia, SpaceX, Google Cloud, Spotify, Culver’s, American Express, and Coca-Cola, plus infrastructure and kit behavior, without publishing named compromised organizations or account counts.

Is the GoodGuys SpaceX skin the same operation as the Starship fake-event campaign?

The GoodGuys SpaceX skin reuses lure copy from the Starship Product Briefing fake-event campaign that Push Security analyzed on 5 November 2026, but kits and hosting differ and a same-operator link is not established in the sources. The shared language is adjacent campaign context when triaging mail, not proof of identical operators.